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A SYNTHESIS FOR NATURAL LAW
Howard Newcomb Morse*
"Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness:
for they shall be filled."-St. Matthew, Chapter 5, Verse 6.

C

OMPARATIVE negligence, comparative rectitude and vol-

untary manslaughter erroneously have been classified and
treated separately by legal scholars. The truth is that the three
constitute one legal doctrine. Under the first the lesser negligence
of the plaintiff in effect is subtracted from the greater negligence
of the defendant, and the plaintiff is awarded damages proportionate to the difference. Under the second the lesser statutory
ground for divorce of which the libelant is guilty (drunkenness
for example) in effect is held malum prohibitum (borrowing from
the Criminal Law) or bad in a legal sense but only disapproved
of in a moral sense while the more serious statutory ground of
which the libelee is guilty (such as adultery) in effect is held
malum in se or bad in a moral as well as legal sense because it
violates the Seventh Commandment, and a decree of divorcement
is awarded the libelant. Under the third the provocation given
the defendant by the victim in effect is subtracted from the
criminal act of the defendant, and the defendant is awarded the
difference in the form of mitigation of punishment, it being necessary, of course, that there be the element of provocation in
order to preclude murder and that the provocation be less than
the counter-act in order to preclude justifiable self-defense.
The doctrine of comparative fault has its origin in the canonical
law:' "When mutual injuries have been inflicted they offset each
other, unless one of the parties, because the injury done by him
*LL.B., Tulane University; member of the Georgia and United States Supreme
Court Bars; author of numerous articles in various legal journals.
1 CODEX IURIS CANONICI, Canon 2218, § 3.

1954]

SYNTHESIS FOR NATURAL LAW

was greater, ought to suffer some penalty, mitigated according
to the requirements of the case."
Legal scholars heretofore have considered the Constitutional
Law doctrine of judicial review (or unconstitutionality) and the
Corporation Law doctrine of ultra vires as two separate and
distinct legal doctrines. However, the truth is that these two constitute the one and the same doctrine of supersedence. The origin
of the doctrine goes back to England in the year 1610 when Sir
Edward Coke declared in the Case of the College of Physicians
(or Dr. Bonham's Case) :? "It appears in our books, that in many
cases the common law will control acts of parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and
adjudge such act to be void."
In America almost 200 years later Sir Edward Coke's theory
was appropriated by Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury
v. Madison.' In that case the Chief Justice stated: "Certainly all
those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and,
consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that
an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void."
In case of conflict, just as a legislative act must bow to a constitution in the domain of Public Law, so too must a corporate act
bow to a charter in the realm of Corporate Law. The year after
the Marbury decision Mr. Chief Justice Marshall declared in the
case of Head,v. Providence Insurance Co.: 4 "He who authorizes
another to make a writing for him, makes it himself; but with
these bodies which have only a legal existence, it is otherwise.
The act of incorporation is to them an enabling act; it gives them
28 Co. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C. P. 1610).

31 Cranch 137, 177 (U. S. 1803).
4 2 Cranch 127, 169 (U. S. 1804).
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all the power they possess; it enables them to contract, and when
it prescribes to them a mode of contracting, they must observe
that mode, or the instrument no more creates a contract than if
the body had never been incorporated." Here is the emergence of
the ultra vires idea. Several years later Mr. Chief Justice Marshall pursued the same thought in the case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,' wherein he stated: "A corporation
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence."
The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest level
tribunal in America in practice but not in theory. It is in theory
not a court of last resort but of second-to-last resort, for the ultimate function of a court is not exercised in the United States.
The Supreme Court can decide whether a law is in conflict with
the Constitution but not whether a law is in conflict with morality.
Just as a corporate act performed in violation of a charter and
a legislative act passed in violation of a constitution are void, so
too should be a law in violation of our code of morality. A law
would not be enacted by the Congress unless the Congress felt
that in addition to authority in the Constitution for the law there
is authority in our moral system for the law. But just as the
Congress has been wrong about constitutional authority for laws
(as the Supreme Court many times has pointed out), so too has
the Congress been wrong about moral authority for laws. But
lack of moral authority for a law is not pointed out because America has no court with such jurisdiction.
What is needed is a Morality Court. It would be to a chancery
court what a chancery court is to a law court in ameliorating
inequity, inequality, injustice and immorality. Just as the power
of the Supreme Court of the United States to decide whether a
54

Wheat. 518, 636 (U. S. 1819).
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law is in conflict with the Constitution is known as judicial review,
so the power of the Morality Court to decide whether a law is in
conflict with morality would be known as moral review. Here would
be a court not like the ecclesiastical courts of old which would
deal only with things spiritual but a court which would answer
the integrated needs of the whole fabric of modern human society,
both temporal and spiritual.
The phrase "public policy" indicates man's groping in the
darkness for a tribunal to render consistency to an inflexible
standard of morality. A law passed by a state legislature must
be within the public policy of the state. A contract may be denied
enforcement by the state if contrary to the public policy of the
state. And a law of the state consonant with the public policy of
the state may be denied enforcement in another state if contrary
to the public policy of such other state. Here we have a duality
of public policies. The public policy of a state constitutes the
recognition by the state of a moral authority for its law. Therefore, there can be but one moral authority for all the states or,
for that matter, for all the nations of the western world. A duality
of public policies simply belies the fact that one of the public
policies is wrong. Thus, just as the Morality Court would decide in
cases of conflict between law and morality, so too it would decide
in cases of conflict between public policies.
It is supremely ironic that all people in a nation are conclusively presumed to know the secular law and are compelled to
obey it but not the higher and better law, the sectarian law, in
the image of which the secular law is imperfectly made. The First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees
freedom of religion - freedom of the individual to choose the
body of sectarian law to which he desires to be held accountable.
But, to make an understatement, although there is freedom of
religion, there is no freedom of law - freedom of the individual to choose the body of secular law to which he desires to be
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held amenable. There are many instances of moral duties which
are not legal duties because morality, unlike law, is all-inclusive.
There is no statute of limitations on moral obligations. American
modernity has given man freedom from religion but not freedom
from law. Man in a gregarious environment cannot be given
freedom from law. He has even less right to freedom from
religion than he has to freedom from law. Religion as a Godgiven obligation supersedes the man-made obligation of law.
The civil law always is in a state of flux, but the ecclesiastical
law, because of its divine origin and consequent infallibility, is
immutable. The canonical law is primarily concerned with human
values, the temporal law with property values. This is what
caused - and continues - the great schism between the moral
law and the civil law. The only way for the civil law to imitate
more closely the moral law is for there to be a change of accent
in the civil law from property values to human values.
What is needed is an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and to the organic law of every sovereign nation
in the world which would outlaw war.
Article 9 of Chapter II of the Constitution of Japan of November 3, 1946, states: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes. In order to
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized." This provision was forced upon a vanquished nation by
a victor. How wonderful it would be for a nation voluntarily to
adopt such a provision.
It would be even better if a denunciation-of-war organic amendment went beyond a mere statement of principle and policy and
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were cast in the same form as an incapacitating statute, specifying
that the nation henceforth does not have the legal capacity to
wage war. It would be a further improvement if such an organic
amendment should be made non-amendable, such as is the provision in Article V (dealing with the amendatory process) of the
Constitution of the United States which declares: "Provided ...
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's [sic]
equal Suffrage in the Senate."
Defensive warfare, on the other hand, is simply self-defense
on an international level. If the organic law of every sovereign
nation included a denunciation-of-war amendment in the form of
a non-amendable, incapacitating provision, defense warfare would
result only if a nation violated her own self-imposed organic
restraint by waging aggressive warfare. Even the canonical law6
states: "The circumstance of legitimate defense against an unjust
aggressor, if due moderation be observed, entirely excuses from
crime; otherwise it merely diminishes imputability; and the same
is to be said of provocation." How can this be reconciled with:
"But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also?"
The greatest function of equity is in appropriate cases to exercise human moderation and thereby to exempt one from the
harshness of the common law. The tenth maxim of equity, according to Pomeroy',s classification, is: "Equity will not suffer a
wrong without a remedy." But equity relieves against the hardships of the common law only within the civil law fold. What is
needed is a doctrine substantially equivalent to equity to temper
the severity of the common and statutory law in proper cases
within the province of the Criminal Law.
The doctrine of epikeia, which is based on the canonical law,
should be adopted, as it would fill admirably this lacuna which in
certain cases causes grave lack of justice tempered with mercy.
6 Canon 2205, § 4.
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Delict liability should rest upon the State for injuries arising
from the criminal acts or conduct of any of its citizens. Every
criminal is a product of his environment in the restricted sense
and of society in the generic sense. The only legalistic balance
that can be struck between these two extremes is the State - the
geographical boundaries of the State; for it is the law of the
State with its territorial application which has been violated. It
is axiomatic that every right bestows a corresponding onus. The
State has been delegated the right to prescribe criminal laws and
to punish for infractions thereof. This right carries with it the
duty to accept tortious responsibility for injuries resulting from
such violations.
Epikeia applied in the negative criminal sense would mean the
excusing of guilt in a particular case by the court because:
1. The operation of the law would result in such hardship for
the defendant as would cause the conscience of society to
suffer thereby;
2. The intention of the framers of the statute, as represented
by the moral background pertaining to such statute, mani.
fests approval of the suspension of such statute in the par.
ticular case.
Epikeia applied in the positive criminal sense would mean the
placing of delict liability upon the State by the court because:
1. The absence of organic and statutory authority conferring
tortious responsibility would result in such hardship for
one injured by the criminal act of another as would cause
the conscience of society to suffer thereby;
2. The intention of the framers of the organic and statutory
law, especially the Bill of Rights, as represented by the
moral background pertaining to such statute, manifests approval of the suspension of such statute in the particular
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case. (For example, a case where the perpetrator is not
apprehended or a case where the defendant is insolvent.)
The nearest approach to a realization of positive epikeia is
represented by the case of George Wong v. The City and County
of San Francisco,number 1783, decided in 1947 by the Appellate
Department of the Superior Court of San Francisco County, California. Authority for the Wong case is the decision in Brauer v.
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company' by the
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. In the Wong case
there was a collision between a municipal trolley and a motor car
due to the negligence of the trolley motorman. The money in possession of one of the three plaintiffs apparently was stolen by an
unknown third party while such plaintiff was unconscious. The
City contended that its delict responsibility could not be extended
to include a loss occasioned by the commission of a crime by a
third party. The court held the City liable for the loss of the
money. Here we have, not delict liability upon the State in a
criminal case, but delict liability upon a subdivision of the State
in a delict case in which such subdivision is the defendant for a
loss resulting from the commission of a crime. This symbolizes
the opening wedge in obtaining a full recognition of positive
epikeia.
A defendant accused of a crime cannot be convicted unless his
guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The origin of this
doctrine lies in the degree of proof necessary to prove heroic
virtues or martyrdom and miracle to the Sacred Congregation
of Rites preliminary to beatification.
P. Charles Augustine, O.S.B., D.D., in his A Commentary on
the New Code of Canon Law' states: "Full proof is one which
convinces the judge and prompts him to give sentence without
further investigation. A probatio semiplena or half-proof is one
7 91 N. J. L. 190, 103 Atl. 166, 1 A.L.R. 734 (1918).
8 Vol. 7, p. 192 (B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, 1930).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

that leaves room for reasonable doubt." Since a probatio semiplena
or half-proof is one that leaves room for reasonable doubt, a fullproof (plena probatio or plenam fidemfacere) is one that leaves
no room for reasonable doubt. In the same work the Rev. Augustine states that for beatification, "The proofs must be full
(plenae) and no others are admitted." 9
Damian Joseph Blaher, O.F.M., A.B., J.C.L., in his The Ordinary Processes in Causes of Beatification and Canonization0
states: "In causes of beatification and canonization the proofs
must be altogether complete (omnino plena). Canon 2019. This
by no means signifies that every proof offered in the ordinary
processes must of and by itself be one that produces perfect
moral certitude; it merely means that, in the over-all picture, no
definite decision concerning beatification or canonization itself,
or relative to those sentences of the Congregation of Rites which
immediately precede the actual beatification or canonization, will
be given unless the proofs, taken as a whole, are entirely full
(omnino plena) and beget perfect moral certitude. Noval, De
Processibus, II, 77."
How can one reconcile the Criminal Law doctrine that a defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt with the doctrine of the original sin of man and its canonical
outgrowth1' which states: "When an external violation of the law
has been committed, malice is presumed in the external forum
until the contrary is proved?" If one can answer this question,
then one will not have any difficulty with the next question. After
Cain slew Abel, Cain dwelt in the land of Nod, on the east of
Eden, and took unto himself a wife. Where did the wife come
from if Cain and Abel were the only children of the first man
and woman on earth?
0 Id.

at 389.

1) (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1949) 156.
1" Canon 2200, § 2.
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The two scales held by Justitia contain presumptions and burdens respectively and are evenly balanced. The law casts certain
rebuttable presumptions in favor of or against a plaintiff. If the
presumption is in favor of the plaintiff, it operates against the
defendant, and if the presumption is against the plaintiff it
operates in favor of the defendant. Each praesumptio a lege or
presumption cast by the law in turn casts an onus probandus or
burden of proof upon the party (plaintiff or defendant) against
whom the presumption operates. Only if the burden is carried
successfully by the party upon whom it is cast can the presumption be overturned. For example, in the Criminal Law the law
casts a presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant. This
presumption then casts a burden upon the plaintiff (the State).
The burden thus cast is the requirement that the State must prove
the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. If this is
thought by the jury to have been done, then the presumption is
overcome.
A presumption cannot be measured in weight until first the
burden which it casts is looked to. For example, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is the heaviest burden of proof known to the
law. Therefore, the presumption of innocence of crime is a strong
presumption indeed. However, when one considers that pawnbrokers in Michigan are required by law 2 to take thumb prints
of pawnors, one realizes that many petty assaults are being made
against the idea of a presumption of innocence. Also, consider
the implication behind Section 159(h) of the Labor Management
Relations Act,1" the so-called Taft-Hartley Law of 1947, which
conditions the recognition of labor organizations on the filing with
the National Labor Relations Board of non-Communist affidavits
by the officers thereof, but does not require the officers of management to file non-Communist affidavits. Thus, a presumption of
innocence of Communistic affiliation extends to the officers of manMicu. CoMP. L. (1948) §§ 445, 472.
61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 1946 ed. Supp. V, § 159(h).

123
13
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agement, but is withheld from the officers of labor organizations.
Another example of the assaults being made upon the great
presumption of innocence is represented by the case of Schaff
v. R. W. Claxton, Inc. 4 The decision was that a motorist who
leaves his keys in his motor car may be liable for damages if his
vehicle is stolen and involved in an accident, the theory being
that the owner made it easy for his vehicle to be stolen by leaving
the keys in it. This assault upon the strong presumption of innocence perhaps is of the status of a grand, rather than a petty, assault
because it victimizes all society by extending a prospective application of a presumption of guilt to all persons. In order to facilitate a third party plaintiff to recover damages, this decision does
not merely charge the owner alone with liability but in effect also
holds all other members of society as potential thieves.
Consistent with the sectarian doctrine of original sin but in
conflict with the secular presumption of innocence are the Criminal Law defense of entrapment and its Family Law counterpart,
connivance. Here a situation exists where one secular doctrine
(entrapment) is in conflict with another secular doctrine (presumption of innocence). The situation is unique in irony in that
both of these doctrines, entrapment and presumption of innocence,
exist within the same branch of the secular law (Criminal Law).
Entrapment rightfully will be discarded as an accepted defense
to crime when three analogies are recognized: (1) the doctrinal
analogy of entrapment to the sectarian concept of temptation,
(2) the symbolical analogy of the secular police officer (in whose
mind the criminal enterprise suggested to the entrapped originated) to the sectarian Satan who counsels the surrender to
temptation, and (3) the doctrinal analogy of suggested secular
crime to suggested sectarian sin.
The law casts a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit a delict or a crime in favor of infants between the ages of
14 144 F. 2d 532 (D. C. Cir. 1944).
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10 and 14. If an infant between these ages is accused of crime,
then the law casts two presumptions in the defendant's favor that of innocence and that of incapacity. The presumption of
incapacity casts a burden on the State to prove the capacity of
the infant defendant by a preponderance of evidence. This burden
bears the least weight of the three principal burdens of proof
known to the law. There are many rebuttable presumptions, but
they must all fall within the three weight divisions determined
by the law's three principal burdens of proof. These three are:
1. The lightweight division - a bare preponderance of evidence in ordinary civil cases.
2. The middleweight division - a "clear and convincing" or
"clear and satisfactory" preponderance of evidence in certain classes of civil cases.
3. The heavyweight division-proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in criminal cases.
When a presumption is present, proof is contingent upon it.
Proof is lessened if the presumption favors the plaintiff, increased
if the presumption favors the defendant. There frequently are
present two presumptions, one favoring the plaintiff and the other
favoring the defendant. In such a case there is a subtraction of
the lesser presumption from the greater, similar to the way in
which the legal doctrines of comparative negligence and comparative rectitude work. There sometimes is present a multiplicity
of presumptions on either or both sides.
All rebuttable presumptions, unlike those which are conclusive,
are capable of flux. The presumption in favor of the defendant
and the burden of proof incumbent upon the plaintiff constitute
the same mathematical amount, the former actual, the latter
potential. As the plaintiff proceeds to carry the burden, the mathematical amount representing the presumption gradually decreases
in direct ratio to the increase of the mathematical amount repre-
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senting the burden. If the burden is successfully carried, the
mathematical amount representing potentiality is translated into
actuality.
For example, it is well known that innocence is a very strong
presumption and that proof beyond a reasonable doubt or to a
moral certainty is a very strong burden. The two represent the
same mathematical amount, let us say 90. At the outset the 90
representing the presumption is actual and the 90 representing
the burden is potential. As the trial proceeds and the carrying
of the burden is undertaken, the actual 90 is first cut down to
89 and the lost point is shifted to the potential 90 to start transforming the potential 90 representing the burden into an actual
90. If and when there is a complete displacement of the actual
90 from the defendant to the plaintiff, the case has been made
because proved. The scales of justice thus acquire a new meaning.
The law holds that a gambling contract is void ab initio as
against the public policy of the State. The insurance business is
excepted from the law. If a man insures a form of property he
owns for $25,000 (it being worth that amount to him and he
thinking it worth that sum, but in reality it being worth only
$15,000) and the property is destroyed, he receives $10,000 less
than the amount of his insurance policy even though he paid
higher premiums on a $25,000 policy than he would have paid
on one for $15,000. After the loss he is not refunded the difference in premium rates. When a man enters into a contract of
property insurance with an insurance company, he is betting
against his own property and the company is betting for the
property. Who are worth billions of dollars - the policy-holders
or the insurance companies? Betting on the side of property in
a capitalistic society is about as safe as betting heads while
tossing a coin with heads on both sides.
"Thou shalt not kill." Consider the relative morality of life
insurance. When a man enters into a contract of life insurance,
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he is betting with the insurance company against his own life.
How far removed morally is this from suicide? And when a man
has an insurable interest in another's life and procedes to enter
into a contract of life insurance on the other's life, he is betting
with the insurance company against the other's life. How far
removed morally is this from murder?
"Equal justice under law." These are at least noble words.
Public policy, like the double-edged sword held by the blindfolded Justitia balancing the scales, cuts two ways. Just as public
policy can permit any type of contract (such as insurance even
though underwriting morally is gambling), so too it can prohibit any type of contract. Installment loan contracts contain acceleration clauses, meaning, for example, that if the first of twelve
monthly installments is defauted all other eleven installments also
become immediately due. If the default is not the fault of the
debtor, is he not the one of all persons who deserves an extension
rather than a shortening of the length of time in which to repay
the debt. Yet the law does not bother to look into the circumstances
to find out whether the debtor is a victim of misfortune or a
cheat. He is in effect presumed to be a cheat. This idea at least
works in fine with the doctrine of the original sin of man.
Also, it is a common practice for public service companies to
allow a discount on their bills for service to their consumers if
the statements are paid within a certain time. Yet does not the
consumer who is unable to pay the bill within the stipulated
time need the discount, if it be given at all, more than the others?
But the public service companies, like equity, follow the law.
Thus, whether it be a penalty or a benefit such as a discount,
the debtor class is given the former and denied the latter.
In Ohio a law 5 provides for pawnbrokers to exact one of two
monthly storage fees depending upon the size of the pledge in
addition to the monthly rate of interest stipulated on the pawn
15

OHIO

REV. CODE

(Anderson, 1953) § 4727.06.
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ticket. Now a pledge agreement is a special form of bailment
contract, and as such the very nature of the loan for which
interest is charged includes storage of the pledge by the pledgee
(or bailee) as a necessary part thereof. Thus, a necessary part of
the bailment relationship is paid for two different ways by the
bailor. This is an example of a statutory perversion of the
common law.
The law has a legal rate of interest. The legal rate does not
mean much because usually the creditor can make the interest
rate still higher up to another maximum if he reduces the contract to writing, and as a matter of practice he almost always
does so. But the legal rate serves two purposes:
1. If the contract is parol, the interest rate cannot be higher
than the legal rate.
2. If the contract is reduced to writing and no interest rate
is stipulated therein, then the legal rate prevails.
But what is the moral rate of interest (assuming for a moment
that interest itself is moral)?
Two paramount virtues which we are ostensibly interested in
having inculcated into young children are thrift and religious
faith. A commendable thrift program for little children once
prevailed in the public grade schools of some of Chicago's
suburbs. This program was described by an Illinois appellate
court in the case of Thrift, Inc., v. State Bank & Trust Co. 6 as
follows: "Savings deposits were accepted on a school room basis
by teachers on behalf of the [Evanston] banks. The children
were given pass books and urged to make weekly deposits. The
entry in the pass book in each case was made by the teacher. At
the. same time a carbonized duplicate deposit slip was made and
later turned over to the principal, together with the money
received. At the end of the day both money and deposit slips
16 298 I1. App. 501, 504, 19 N. E. 2d 126, 127 (1939).
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were collected by messengers from the respective banks." Yet this
worthwhile thrift project was held by the court to be unlawful on
the ground that it violated a statute prohibiting branch banking.
Once many of the public grade schools and high schools in
Illinois outside of Chicago had voluntary religious education
classes for Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish children. This
voluntary religious education program in many public primary
and secondary schools in Illinois was described by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in 1947 in the case of People ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Education of School District No. 7]17 as follows:
"The record discloses that in the fall of 1940 the Champaign
Council of Religious Education, a voluntary association of Jewish,
Roman Catholic and Protestant faiths, was formed. They immediately sought and secured from the board of education of
Champaign School District No. 71, permission to offer classes
in religious education in grades four through nine. Qualified
instructors, all material and books, as well as incidentals, were
to be furnished at the expense of the council. Admission to the
classes was to be allowed only upon the express written request
of parents, and then only to classes designated by the parents.
They were to be excused by the board from attendance in the
grade schools for 30 minutes and from the junior high school
for a period of 45 minutes in each week for participation in the
religious education classes. Classes were to be scheduled so as
not to interfere with the regular public-school classes after consultation with the public-school teacher.-Each faith-Catholic,
Jewish and Protestant, was to have its separate instructional classes
and no expense in connection with the classes was to be borne by
the board. Additional groups were to be freely permitted to participate upon the same terms. Lesson materials and curriculum
were to be selected by a committee representative of all groups
participating and in a manner to avoid any offensive, doctrinal,
dogmatic or sectarian teaching. It is apparent the teaching was
17

396 IMi.14, 16, 17, 71 N. E. 2d 161, 162.
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to be of the content of the Bible without interpretation or attempt
at influencing belief in the doctrines or creeds of any church."
Yet, while the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained this meritorious religious education project, the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1948" nevertheless held the project unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the guarantee of religious
freedom contained in the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in effect holding freedom of religion
to mean freedom from religion.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion summed up
the attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States by stating:
"If nowhere else, in the relation between Church and State, 'good
fences make good neighbors'."1 9 But what the Court really did
was to erect a "spite fence" on the part of the State against Christianity. Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion states: ". ..
[W]e are likely to make the legal 'wall of separation between
church and state' as winding as the famous serpentine wall
designed by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded. 20 (Mr.
Jefferson also founded the "wall of separation" metaphor.) To
which the reply may be -made: "You and your colleagues and
your immediate, but not more remote, predecessors already have."
Both of the foregoing cases arose in Illinois with opposite
disposition by the Illinois courts but the same ultimate
result. In the Thrift case the Illinois court let technicality blind
it to virtue. Can it be supposed that the framers of the Illinois
statute prohibiting branch banking would have considered a grade
school 'a branch bank because little children were encouraged to
make small deposits there in order better to teach them the virtue
of thrift? A court should always weigh the relative good that a
18 People of State of Illinois v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 2 A.L.R. 2d
1338.
19 Id. at 232.
20 Id. at 238.
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decision either way will accomplish. In the McCollum case the
Illinois court decided correctly, but the Supreme Court of the
United States made the same mistake that the Illinois court did
in the Thrift case.
There are so many conflicts within the law that there is an
artificial branch of law known as Conflict of Laws. Significantly,
by contrast, there are no conflicts within morality. Thus, the
secular lacks the consistency of the sectarian. The greatest conflicts in the world are between the temporal and the spiritual.
These conflicts stem from the fact that the civil is built upon
reason while the ecclesiastical is built upon revelation. There are
two principal conflicts between the corporal and the clerical. One
is the Church's attitude of submission to material, but not spiritual, force as contrasted with the mundane preoccupation with
defense against material force. A concrete example of secular
adhdrence to defense against material force is the great rebuttable
presumption in Negligence Law of the exercise of ordinary care.
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice McKenna in Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company v.
Landrigan, declared: "The presumption [of due care] is founded
on a law of nature. We know of no more universal instinct than
that of self-preservation - none that so insistently urges to care
against injury. It has its motives to exercise in the fear of pain,
maiming, and death. There are few presumptions based on human
feelings or experience that have surer foundation. .."' On the
plane of aggression, that is, insofar as offense is concerned,
morality approves of spiritual aggressiveness, which is symbolized by evangelism and by the missionary and the convert,
but condemns material aggressiveness; to this the law pays only
"lip service". Those men who in time of war carry over the sectarian attitude of submission into the secular world are either
conscientious objectors or "draft-dodgers." But here the civil arm
of the law extends a presumption of guilt so that such men are
21 191 U. S. 461, 474 (1903).
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bound over to the criminal arm of the law, which in turn extends
to them a presumption of innocence. The other principal conflict
is the sectarian conception of original sin and the fall of man,
analogous to a rebuttable presumption of guilt. It is the theory
that man is naturally corrupt and evil and that as the condition
precedent for his salvation he must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt by good works and prayer that he is otherwise. The secular
conception is the rebuttable presumption of innocence until proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in Criminal Law and the rebuttable presumption that a man does his duty and obeys the law
until disproved by a preponderance of the evidence in civil law.
To conclude this article on a note of moral remindfulness, the
author calls the attention of the reader to the studiedly overlooked
truth contained in the following excerpt from the opinion of the
Supreme Court of California in Hollywood Motion Picture Equipment Company v. Furer: " 'Thou shalt not steal' applies with
equal force and propriety to the industrialists of a complex civilization as to the simple herdsman of ancient Israel." 22

22

16 Cal. 2d 184, 188, 105 P. 2d 299, 301 (1940).

